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COUNTING HEADS ON RFRA 
Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the con-
stitutionality of "RFRA"-the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act.l What will they decide? The issue is of great interest and 
importance for many reasons (including the fact that I have a 
public wager with Professor Chip Lupu on it).z My prediction: 
RFRA will be upheld, without a doubt. In fact-though this is 
going out on a limb-there is a decent likelihood that RFRA will 
be unanimously upheld. To be safe, though, I will predict 7-2 (or 
better) for affirmance of the Fifth Circuit's decision upholding 
RFRA. 
This is not a "should" argument; it is pure nose-counting. (I 
also think that RFRA ought to be upheld on the merits, but that 
is, in the main, a different question. No one would be foolish 
enough to think that just because a particular argument is sound 
it will be accepted by the justices, or that the justices' acceptance 
of an argument makes it sound.) What follows is a description of 
how the justices (probably) will reason, and why they will rule for 
RFRA. The analysis is presented in (roughly) the order of most 
likely to least likely votes for upholding the statute. 
I. START WITH THE MIDDLE 
The constitutionality of RFRA is one of those rare cases that 
could make for a strange-bedfellows, both-ends-against-the-mid-
dle coalition striking down the statute, on a combination of 
grounds each of which is rejected by a firm majority of the Court. 
For the uninitiated: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act "re-
stores" the "strict scrutiny" test for government action that im-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I first ex-
plored these views with friends and colleagues on the "religionlaw" e-mail chat group, 
and have benefitted from the remarks of numerous persons in that format. The views 
expressed are, of course, my own. Copyright 1997. 
1. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding RFRA against 
several constitutional challenges), cert. granted sub nom. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. 
Ct. 293 (1996). 
2. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and 
the U.S. Code, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 249, 293 n.l20 (1995). 
7 
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poses a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, even 
where the governmental action is facially and formally neutral 
with respect to religion. The Supreme Court initially embraced 
this test in 1963 as the correct interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause of the Constitution, in the case of Sherbert v. Vemer.3 
The Court applied that standard inconsistently for a quarter cen-
tury, then abandoned it (for the most part) in 1990, in a contro-
versial opinion for the Court authored by Justice Scalia (and 
joined by Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Kennedy), in Employ-
ment Divison v. Smith.4 RFRA "restores" the Sherbert test as a 
matter of federal statutory law-a civil rights statute-and man-
dates that that test be applied to all governmental action, includ-
ing state governmental action, that results in a substantial burden 
on religious exercise. 
The conventional thinking of the RFRA nay-sayers is that 
Scalia and the "conservatives" (Rehnquist, Thomas, and maybe 
Kennedy) hate both free exercise exemptions (that is, the Sher-
bert view rejected in Smith) and the so-called "Morgan Power" of 
Congress to enact legislation under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that goes beyond what the Court has said are the 
minimum judicially-enforceable mandates of section one of the 
Amendment.s They thus count three sure (Scalia, Rehnquist, 
Thomas) and two probable (Kennedy and O'Connor) votes 
against RFRA on this ground, with the remainder to be made up 
from the hard left of the Court-Ginsburg and Stevens, and 
maybe Breyer-who might tend to think that any discretionary 
accommodation of religious exercise violates the Establishment 
Clause. 
As I explain later, I think that both sets of arguments are 
mistaken, as a matter of prognostication. The "conservative" 
core of the Smith majority (excluding the since-retired Justice 
Byron White) does not consist of religion-haters or Morgan-bait-
ers so much as deferentialists who would prefer to let legislators 
draft accommodation statutes. The liberal bloc may fear reli-
gious establishment unduly, but probably not so much as to top-
ple RFRA. 
Still, the nay-sayers' arguments are not ludicrous, and one 
could imagine a public choice nightmare under which three jus-
tices vote to strike down RFRA as in excess of Congress' power 
3. 374 u.s. 398 (1963). 
4. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
5. The" Morgan Power" derives its name from Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966), the leading modem case involving interpretation of the scope of Congress' legisla-
tive power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1997] COUNTING HEADS ON RFRA 9 
under section five (with six disagreeing with such a view), three 
justices vote to strike down RFRA as an Establishment Clause 
violation (with six disagreeing), but only three thinking it clears 
both hurdles. The holding of the Court becomes the composite 
of two different positions each of which is rejected by a (differ-
ent) solid majority of six. Come to think of it, I've witnessed this 
nightmare in real life, more than a couple of times. I was in the 
courtroom the day our collective geniuses handed down County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU.6 Four justices thought that public sea-
sonal display of either a creche or a menorah was constitutionally 
permissible. Three Justices thought that display of either was un-
constitutional. 1\vo (Blackmun and O'Connor) thought the 
creche was unconstitutional but the menorah wasn't. Thus, the 
holding of the Court was the two-justice view, rejected in princi-
ple by the seven who thought that different treatment of the two 
religious symbols was the one answer that couldn't possibly be 
right. Even stranger things have happened.? 
In any event, it certainly makes sense to start my nose-
counting with the three most solid votes for RFRA-those who 
will think it clears both the section five and the Establishment 
Clause hurdles. They are (in order) O'Connor, Souter, and Ken-
nedy, the infamous Casey troika.B 
O'Connor's the easy one. She concurred in the judgment 
only in Smith, harshly criticizing the majority's abandonment of 
the Sherbert test.9 She adhered to this position in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, joining Justice Black-
mun's separate concurrence refusing to accept the Smith rule.1o 
6. 492 u.s. 573 (1989). 
7. Everyone has his particular favorite. The classic example is, of course, National 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The question was whether 
the District of Columbia is a "state" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The judgment 
of the Court upheld jurisdiction, though every rationale for the judgment was rejected by 
a clear majority of justices. Three justices said that the District was not a "state" within 
the meaning of the diversity clause of Article III but that Congress had power, under the 
seat of government clause of Article I, to create federal jurisdiction anyway. Id. at 583-
604 (opinion of Jackson, J.). (Six justices disagreed.) Two justices said that the District 
could be considered a "state" for purposes of the diversity clause of Article III. Id. at 
604-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring). (Seven justices disagreed.) The four dissenters also 
split 2-2. 
For an argument that such public choice nightmares are inherent in the operation of 
a multi-member court, where multiple issues are presented in a single case or where issues 
come to the court in an essentially random order, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of 
Criticizing the Coun, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 813-31 (1982). 
8. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Joint Opinion of Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter). 
9. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
10. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2250 (1993) 
(Biackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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For O'Connor to find RFRA unconstitutional would be almost 
inconceivable, as she would have to conclude that it is unconsti-
tutional for Congress to adopt, by statute, under section five, the 
same substantive rule that she thinks is required by section one 
properly construed. I have seen the argument, advanced most 
prominently by Professor Dan Conkle, that the Court should (1) 
strike down RFRA; and then (2) overrule Smith.II But this has 
never made much sense to me, and I doubt if it would to 
O'Connor. On what principled ground can one strike down 
RFRA as invalid if it is legislation "enforcing the requirements 
of' section one of the Amendment as the justice(s) is (are) now 
about to construe that amendment in the next section of the 
opinion? The necessary premise of any holding that RFRA ex-
ceeds Congress' section five power is that this is not a statute to 
"enforce" the provisions of section one because it enforces a rule 
that is "bigger" than the actual meaning of the prohibition of sec-
tion one. For RFRA, that means saying that Congress cannot 
pass this statute under its enforcement power because this re-
stricts state power more than Smith does. That necessarily entails 
a determination that Smith is rightly decided. A necessary prem-
ise of RFRA's invalidity is that it legislates a rule that is inconsis-
tent with (too much "bigger" than) the "correct" constitutional 
interpretation of section one. Thus, if the compelling interest test 
is the correct reading of the Free Exercise Clause, there can be 
no plausible argument that RFRA is unconstitutional. It would 
be positively weird for O'Connor (or Souter) to vote to strike 
down RFRA and, in the next breath, reiterate that Smith was 
wrongly decided and should be overruled in a proper case. 
Of course, we will all do seemingly weird things if we think it 
is necessary to vindicate some larger principle. A homey exam-
ple: My four-year-old son is required to ask permission before 
going outside to play in the back yard. Once last summer-at 
least once-he went out without asking. I brought him in and 
placed him in the naughty chair for reiteration of the standing 
rule. After I was sure he understood that he needed to ask per-
mission, he proceeded to ask permission, which I gave. My 
young formalist gave me a perplexed look and asked why I had 
punished him for doing what I was prepared to let him do 
anyway. 
To vindicate authority, of course (and to enforce the ad-
vance-permission rule)! The only plausible argument for 
11. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional 
Significance of An Unconstitutional Statute, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 39 (1995). 
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O'Connor invalidating RFRA is precisely this sort of hyper-judi-
cial supremacist opinion, that seeks to vindicate courts' authority 
to say what the law is even when they don't disagree with what 
the legislature has said it is. There are shades of this in the Joint 
Opinion in Casey, but I doubt that any of the Casey three would 
go this faoz O'Connor, for one, does not have a hostile reading 
of the section five power to begin with, as her opinion in Croson 
makes fairly cleaf.l3 Count O'Connor as a solid vote to affirm 
the Fifth Circuit's upholding of RFRA, which vindicates 
O'Connor's position in Smith. 
Count David Souter, too. Souter is also on record, in his 
separate concurrence in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah,14 as doubting the correctness of Smith and, 
moreover, as saying that principles of stare decisis should not re-
quire the Court to adhere to it-an especially significant factor 
for the Casey troika. The significance lies in the fact that 
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy placed huge reliance on a grand 
doctrine of stare decisis in order to justify their votes in Casey-
votes which, for some of them, involved pretty clear flip-flops 
from their earlier positions.ls For Souter, the Harvard legal pro-
cess school protege and the probable moving force behind the 
Casey Three's invocation of stare decisis, to say that Smith is 
nonetheless fair game, virtually makes it so. At least, it gives the 
green light to O'Connor and Kennedy; and, of course, it clearly 
signals Souter's willingness to repudiate Smith. (O'Connor, too, 
has labored mightily to distinguish Casey's high-church version of 
stare decisis in subsequent cases. Her opinion in Adarand Con-
12. It seems to me quite unlikely that Justice O'Connor would simultaneously (i) 
continue to insist that Smith is wrong; and (ii) defer to the majority's contrary view as a 
basis for a further holding that RFRA exceeds Congress' power. Again, though, such 
madness is not unprecedented. Federal courts/sovereign immunity buffs will recognize 
this as Justice White's slightly ludicrous position in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 
56-57 (1989) (White, J., concurring and dissenting). To paraphrase (and I exaggerate only 
slightly): "I don't think that this statute purports to abrogate state sovereign immunity, 
but because the majority disagrees with me, I reach the question of whether Congress has 
power to do what I think it did not do, and agree that they have such power. Therefore, I 
join the judgment that they could and did exercise such power, even though I really think 
they could and did not exercise such power." Got that? 
13. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (opinion of 
O'Connor, J.) ("The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define 
situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophy-
lactic rules to deal with those situations.") (citing and quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U.S. 641 (1%6), with approval). 
14. 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
15. See generally, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, 10 Canst. Comm. 221, 232 
(1993) (reviewing Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (1992)). 
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structors, Inc., v. Pena,16 overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. 
FCC,11 takes pains to rationalize and reconcile the interment of 
Metro with the respect accorded Roe. Interestingly, that portion 
of O'Connor's Adarand opinion was joined only by Justice Ken-
nedy.ls Notwithstanding Casey, stare decisis alone surely will not 
be enough to keep Souter, or O'Connor-or anyone else for that 
matter-from upholding RFRA in the face of Smith.19) 
Stare decisis in fact works very strongly in favor of RFRA. 
And here is where Anthony Kennedy becomes the clear third 
vote to uphold. The Morgan Power accounts for a significant 
body of law, and a long series of decisions recognizes it. Con-
sider the following statutes, upheld by the Supreme Court, that 
can only be accounted for by Morgan: the nationwide ban on 
literacy tests (Oregon v. Mitchell);zo the power of Congress under 
section five to abrogate state sovereign immunity principles 
(Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer);zl big chunks of the Voting Rights statutes, 
including the power to ban at-large districts with racially dispa-
rate impact (City of Rome );zz the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act;23 and much, much more. Kennedy vote to overrule all these 
cases and strike down these statutes (or call them into doubt with 
a significant narrowing of the Morgan power)? It ain't gonna 
happen. Put more eloquently, it is fair to observe that asserted 
stare decisis interests-reliance, stability, perceptions of judicial 
integrity, and the like-should and will attach more strongly to 
the Morgan rule than to Smith's seven-year half-life. 
Moreover, Kennedy is not all that attached to Smith-and is 
clearly not joined-at-the-hip to Scalia. (Their voting alignment 
patterns were much different in 1990 than they have been 
since.)24 True, Kennedy was part of Scalia's Smith five. But his 
16. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
17. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
18. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-17. 
19. For Souter, perhaps even more clearly than for O'Connor, the argument for 
simple vindication of judicial power is not reason enough to invalidate a statute that pro-
ceeds from correct (to Souter and O'Connor) premises about the meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
20. 400 u.s. 112 (1970). 
21. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
22. 446 u.s. 156 (1980). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
24. The Harvard Law Review's annual statistics show Kennedy voting with Scalia in 
83.1 %, 85.0%, and 84.1% of the cases in the 1987, 1988, and 1989 Terms (Employment 
Division v. Smith being decided during the 1989 Term). After that, the Scalia-Kennedy 
axis is weaker: 72.4% (1990 Term), 62.3% (1991 Term-the year of Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey), 81.6% (the biggest rebound, for the 1992 Term), 75.9% (1993 Term), 75.3% (1994 
Term), 73.4% (1995 Term). In general, Kennedy aligns with Scalia 75% of the time these 
days, as opposed to 85% of the time his first three Terms. See the Supreme Court Voting 
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opm10n for the Court in Hialeah, while it adheres to Smith, 
shows a much more tempered attitude. It is respectful toward 
religious liberty and treats harshly government efforts to sup-
press religion under the guise (a very thin disguise, in Hialeah) of 
formal neutrality. The Hialeah case holds, in effect, that govern-
ment is often not neutral toward religion even when it purports 
to adopt facially "neutral" rules. Perhaps more significantly, Hi-
aleah is an example of what hostile government bodies could do 
(or attempt to do) to religious exercise, armed with the rule of 
Smith-and thus is an example of the type of situation Congress 
could look at and conclude that there is a need for a "prophylac-
tic" rule to enforce the core guarantees of religious free exercise. 
(There is ample legislative history supporting the view that Con-
gress acted, in whole or in part, out of this concern, as the Fifth 
Circuit's opinion in Flores makes clear.zs) 
In short, Kennedy will be respectful of the Morgan prece-
dent and the results that have followed in its wake; he will be 
respectful of the need to protect religious free exercise; he will be 
mindful of the limitations of the Smith rule of formal neutrality; 
and he will be inclined to defer to legislative accommodations of 
free exercise, so long as they do not coerce nonadherents to en-
gage in religious practices. This is more than enough to over-
come his vote in Smith (which can readily be distinguished, as I 
explain below) and whatever mild doubts he might have about a 
broad section five power. Upholding RFRA is the moderate, 
sensible, "statesmanlike" thing to do. 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit decision under review, Flores v. 
City of Boerne,26 is a Patrick Higginbotham opinion. Higginbot-
ham and Kennedy are of similar judicial temperament and styles. 
There is much in the Fifth Circuit opinion that is congenial to 
Kennedy's approach. Take the name off of the Fifth Circuit 
opinion, read it behind a veil of ignorance, and one might have 
guessed it was written by Anthony Kennedy. (A side bet: Ken-
nedy will write the opinion for the Court affirming the Fifth Cir-
cuit, and it will look a lot like Higginbotham's opinion.) 
The middle three are solid for RFRA. 
Alignment tables as published in every November issue of the Harvard Law Review be-
ginning with 102 Harv. L. Rev. 351 (1988) and ending with 110 Harv. L. Rev. 368 (19%). 
25. Flores, 73 F.3d at 1355-56. 
26. 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 19%). 
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II. TRY OUT THE LEFT 
The remaining votes are less sure things, but Justice Breyer 
is probably a solid Vote Number Four for RFRA. Breyer is a 
liberal and also something of a legal process proceduralist. To 
the extent he has more "conservative" impulses than his other 
left-leaning colleagues (Stevens and Ginsburg), those impulses 
are in the direction of deference toward established precedent 
and deference toward congressional or agency policy. Given this 
constellation of attitudes and preferences, it seems highly un-
likely that he would vote to overrule or significantly cripple Mor-
gan. Too much good liberal public policy is at stake (i.e., voting 
rights); too much precedent would need to be overruled; and it is 
too hard to make the argument that RFRA's policy choice for 
strict judicial scrutiny is outside the bounds of what the Four-
teenth Amendment permits. It is not clear whether Breyer 
would embrace the William Brennan/Sherbert v. Verner reading 
of the Free Exercise Clause as an original matter, but far be it 
from him to say that such an interpretation-advanced by the 
courts for a quarter century-is outside the bounds of Congress' 
range of choice under section five, especially given the breadth of 
discretion Morgan has given Congress. 
Some of the same things can be said for Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg. There is no way that Ginsburg votes to overrule, crip-
ple, or significantly restrict Morgan. (If nothing else, she would 
feel the need to leave it open for Congress to pass something like 
the Freedom of Choice Act ("FOCA"), an early-90's congres-
sinal proposal to entrench and extend Roe v. Wade, in the event 
the Court were ever again to come close to overruling the abor-
tion right created in that case.) Breyer is a more solid vote to 
uphold RFRA than is Ginsburg, however, for the simple reason 
that Breyer has something resembling a sensible understanding 
of the Establishment Clause. To be sure, Breyer joined the dis-
senters in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of 
Virginia,z1 but his vote can be explained by the fact that that case 
involved funding of religious organizations' religious activities. 
The majority held (correctly) that exclusion of a student religious 
newspaper from eligibility for funding by a state university (on 
the same basis as other student publications) violates the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise clauses, and that the Establishment 
27. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). For criticism of the dissenters' position, see Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Un· 
constitutional Conditions on "Equal Access" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 653, 660 n.23 (1996). 
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Clause does not authorize such discrimination. The dissenters' 
view-that the Establishment Clause's history and purposes 
demonstrate a specific intent to bar funding of religious organiza-
tions' religious functions-is wrong as an historical and textual 
matter, but not so crazy as to be dismissed as lunacy. Mter all, 
the Court had embraced exactly such a position as its central ani-
mating principle for Establishment Clause adjudication for the 
better part of forty years. Breyer may be forgiven for going 
along. (If anything, the unwillingness to depart from Warren 
Court orthodoxy confirms that Breyer is likely to support 
Morgan.) 
More telling is that Breyer joined the concurrences in the 
judgment in Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory 
Board.zs Pinette involved an Establishment Clause challenge to 
the Ku Klux Klan's posting of a cross in the park in front of the 
Ohio state capitol. The state had a policy of permitting privately-
sponsored displays in the park, which should have made the case 
an easy one: the Free Speech Clause does not permit content-
based discrimination against privately-sponsored speech in a 
public forum or limited public forum. Discrimination against ex-
pression because of its religious nature or elements (though one 
chokes at the idea that the Klan's use of the Cross was "reli-
gious")29 is no different. The issue in Pinette was whether a reli-
gious display-especially an unattended religious display-was 
different, because of Establishment Clause concerns about 
"message of endorsement." A seven-member majority of the 
Court correctly said no, with Justice Scalia writing a categorical 
"private speech is private speech" plurality opinion, not-so-subtly 
taking issue with the soundness of O'Connor's pet contribution 
to the Establishment Clause mess.Jo O'Connor, Souter, and 
Breyer concurred in the judgment, preferring to leave the en-
28. 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2451 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment); id. at 2457 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
29. Justice Thomas rightly expressed horror at this sacrilege, but recognized that the 
religious content of the cross was the only premise under which the proposed censorship 
was sought to be justified before the Court, and joined the Court in rejecting that prem-
ise. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2450-51 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
30. The "message of endorsement" inquiry originated in Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The test 
has had a checkered history, at times appearing to gain the support of a majority of the 
~ourt, cf. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985), yet now appear-
mg to have been abandoned as doctrine even by Justice O'Connor herself. See Board of 
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2495, 2499 (1994) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For criticism of the 
text, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1987). 
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dorsement question open and noting that, in any event, a mis-
taken message of endorsement could be corrected through 
means less restrictive of free expression than a content-based dis-
crimination against religious expression in a public forum (dis-
claimers, for example). 
The concern about Ginsburg is that she actually dissented 
(along with Stevens) in Pinette, preferring to suppress religious 
expression than to tolerate it on an equal basis. Moreover, in 
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District,31 Gins-
burg joined the Stevens position that it is unconstitutional (or at 
least constitutionally suspect) to allow members of the same faith 
to serve together on a politically elected school board, though 
she was not alone in this grievous mistake-in fact, it appears 
that a majority of the Court accepted this proposition.32 
Again, however, even if Ginsburg is generally separationist 
in her instincts, that does not necessarily bode ill for RFRA. It 
was, after all, the liberal icon William Brennan who was the 
champion of Sherbert. He somehow managed to maintain this 
position notwithstanding his strict separationist view of the Es-
tablishment Clause, perhaps by keeping the two positions in sep-
arate analytical boxes. For Brennan (and it could be that 
Ginsburg's position will end up replicating Brennan's), protect-
ing private free exercise, through the device of exemptions from 
laws of general applicability that nonetheless uniquely burden a 
religious adherent's individual conduct, is hugely different from 
anything having to do with (i) direct government funding benefit-
ing religion; and (ii) public religious displays. Rosenberger and 
Pinette, even if wrong, are clearly distinguishable. Kiryas Joel is 
too: it was a sect-specific accommodation involving a religion-
conscious political gerrymander, decided in the wake of the 
Court's invalidation of racial gerrymanders in Shaw v. Reno.33 
RFRA is an across-the-board restoration of a religion-sympa-
thetic test. Only if one thinks that any voluntary accommodation 
of religion by government violates the Establishment Clause is 
there cause for concern about RFRA on establishment grounds. 
I doubt that Justice Ginsburg will find RFRA's core test-Wil-
liam Brennan's old Sherbert test-to violate the Establishment 
31. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). 
32. The law at issue was deemed to be a delegation of governmental authority to a 
religious group, because all the school board members were members of the Satmar sect 
and because the school district boundaries coincided with those of a village drawn along 
religious lines. Id. at 2488-90 (plurality opinion); id. at 2503-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
33. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
1997] COUNTING HEADS ON RFRA 17 
Clause as an overbroad accommodation of religion. In fact, its 
very breadth helps. The fact that RFRA is a truly general and 
reliably neutral accommodation statute, rather than a here's-one-
for-the-Satmar statute, is sufficient to distinguish her Kiryas Joel 
position. 
Moreover, the fact that Flores is basically positioned as 
presenting a question of the facial constitutionality of RFRA 
makes it much harder to muster an Establishment Clause argu-
ment against it in this case. If Flores were a prisoner case involv-
ing a born again Christian fundamentalist demanding the right to 
evangelize his fellow prisoners, or a claim by Sikhs that their chil-
dren must be permitted to wear ceremonial religious knives to 
school (in the face of a flat no-weapons rule ),34 I would be more 
worried about Ginsburg. But even if the grant of certiorari re-
quired consideration of the application of RFRA to the facts in 
Flores (which it does not), it is hard to see how allowing a Catho-
lic church to enlarge its sanctuary (notwithstanding a facially 
"neutral" landmarking statute) is a preferential accommodation 
of the sort deemed uniquely suspect in Kiryas Joel. I doubt that 
even Justice Ginsburg will think that RFRA is unconstitutional 
on its face or in any but its most extreme (and probably errone-
ous) applications. That's Vote Five. 
The real concern would be that Ginsburg may have aligned 
herself with Justice John Paul Stevens on religion cases-Kiryas 
Joel in 1994 and both Rosenberger and Pinette in 1995. Stevens, 
of course, is implacably hostile to religion, in a way that seems to 
go beyond jurisprudence. Religion always loses on the Establish-
ment Clause side, on a strict separationist protection-of-secular-
society-from-religion view. And religion always loses on the Free 
Exercise side, on a what-a-mess-this-gets-us-into-and-what-
makes-religion-so-special-anyway view.3s Stevens even thinks 
that the existence of religious motivations for enacting a law 
should be sufficient reason for invalidating it.36 There seems to 
be more to Stevens' consistently anti-religion opinions than a 
particular view of the Establishment Clause combined with a par-
ticular view of the Free Exercise Clause; rather, there is evidence 
that Stevens simply thinks religion is narrow-minded, suspicious, 
a troubling way for people to view the world (if not affirmatively 
stupid and dangerous), and certainly not something to be accom-
34. The latter is an actual case. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). 
35. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510-13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
36. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,560-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
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modated. This made Stevens a strange fifth vote for Smith, be-
cause the others in the majority (Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and 
Kennedy) had always been consistent accommodationists on the 
Establishment Clause side of things. 
The tendency is to think that Stevens will certainly vote 
thumbs-down on RFRA. But Stevens is no opponent of the 
Morgan Power. What will he do? It is hard to say, and I would 
never bet the ranch on Stevens' favorable vote in any case in-
volving religion. Still, it is not inconceivable that he could vote to 
uphold RFRA, on the theory that Congress has sufficient lati-
tude under section five even to do things that are manifestly stu-
pid, like accommodate religion in ways not required by the Free 
Exercise Clause. The fact that RFRA explicitly defines "reli-
gion" to mean whatever it means in the First Amendment, and 
specifically notes that RFRA leaves the Establishment Clause 
unaffected (as if Congress could trump the Establishment Clause 
if it chose to), makes it hard for even as determined an anti-ac-
commodationist as Stevens to find RFRA to be an establishment 
of religion on its face. But I wouldn't put it past him. 
As we leave the center and left and look right, I count 3 
solid votes for RFRA, one near-solid (Breyer), and one probable 
(Ginsburg), for a 5-1 lean. Still, that five is not firm. Could Ste-
vens and Ginsburg lead the three solid conservatives into an un-
holy alliance to strike down RFRA? 
III. WHY THE RIGHT WILL GET RFRA RIGHT 
Are you ready for the surprise? Remember, you heard it 
here first: Justice Antonin Scalia, the unrepentant author of 
Smith, will vote to uphold the constitutionality of RFRA. In fact, 
he may turn out to be one of the strongest votes to uphold 
RFRA. The reasons can be found in a careful reading of Smith 
itself and in Scalia's general jurisprudence. 
First, Smith is a deference-to-the-legislature opinion. Scalia 
does not argue that the mandatory exemptions view is beyond 
the pale of plausible interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Scalia's argument is, instead, a somewhat more nuanced one: 
As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given 
that meaning. . . . It is a permissible reading of the text ... to 
say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the 
object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a gener-
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ally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First 
Amendment has not been offended.37 
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To be sure, Scalia notes (surely disingenuously) that "[o]ur 
decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct one,"3s but 
he goes on to invite legislatively-granted religious exemptions 
from laws of general applicability: 
Values that are protected against government interference 
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby 
banished from the political process. Just as a society that be-
lieves in the negative protection accorded to the press by the 
Hrst Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively fos-
ter the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that 
believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief 
can be expected to be solicitious of that value in its legislation 
as well. . .. But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-prac-
tice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not 
to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appro-
priate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the 
courts.39 
Smith, for Scalia, fundamentally rests on the principle that 
the mandatory-exemptions view is too strong a reading of the 
ambiguous language of the Free Exercise Clause for judges to 
adopt and apply on their own as a basis for invalidating state and 
federal statutes duly adopted by democratic bodies. Moreover, 
the judicially-created "compelling interest" escape hatch to the 
judicially-embraced strong reading of the clause has a hydraulic 
tendency, in free exercise cases, to degenerate into pure judicial 
ad hoc balancing of the importance of government policies 
against the importance of religious beliefs to their adherents-
the worst of all worlds both because of the Great Satan (for 
Scalia) of balancing tests generally and because the idea of 
judges weighing the importance of· religious beliefs should be 
anathema to serious religious adherents (like Scalia). 
But if the legislature wants to impose such a policy, whole-
sale or retail, Scalia will let it do so. (We'll get to the federal-
versus-state-legislature issue in a moment.) Even if it's a dumb 
idea to have balancing tests, and even if the dumb balancing test 
adopted by RFRA parallels the Court's huge mistake in the 
Sherbert line, the legislature, in Scalia's world, can adopt 
whatever foolish policies it likes as long as the policy falls within 
37. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (emphasis added). 
38. Id. 
39. ld. at 890. 
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the range of the legislature's constitutional authority to legislate. 
The task of the judge, assuming a foolish statute is constitutional, 
is to enforce those foolish legislative policies to the letter, yea, to 
enforce them with a vengeance. (Watch for Scalia to become the 
most agressive enforcer on the Court of an un-watered-down 
compelling interest test under RFRA, even when-and perhaps 
especially when-it requires the courts to reach seemingly per-
verse results. "If Congress wants to pass a stupid law, by golly 
we're going to let them, and we're sure not going to save them 
from their own stupidity.")4o 
For Scalia, the whole issue is whether RFRA is within the 
scope of Congress' authority to legislate. And that is an entirely 
different question from the authority of the courts to create judi-
cial balancing tests out of an ambiguous text. Congress may have 
the power to rush in where the courts should fear to tread. In-
deed, I would not be terribly surprised if Scalia wrote the Opin-
ion of the Court (or at least a concurrence) that said (in essence): 
See? I was right. Smith was rightly decided and the demo-
cratic process is free to grant legislative accommodations, just 
like I said. RFRA is such a statute. And all of those aca-
demic critics who belittled my argument that the legislature 
could protect Bill of Rights freedoms have been proved 
wrong. 
We're not quite home free with Scalia, though. There is still 
the question of whether RFRA is an appropriate accommodation 
statute for Congress to pass and impose on the states. Now, 
some observers think that Scalia will reject RFRA as contrary to 
separation-of-powers, and cite Scalia's opinion for the Court in 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms41 as an illustration. But Scalia would 
never make such a sloppy analytical mistake. RFRA, in form 
(and form matters to a formalist), creates a statutory right where 
there used to be a constitutional right; it does not "overrule" a 
constitutional holding of the Supreme Court or (as in Plaut) leg-
islatively reopen final judicial judgments of dismissal on the mer-
its. Scalia, a good formalist, will recognize that there is 
absolutely no separation of powers problem in Congress adopt-
ing as its statutory standard a now-discarded judicial constitu-
tional test. Nor does the fact that Congress, in its "findings" 
section, criticized Smith transform an otherwise constitutional 
statute into an improper attempt to "dictate" constitutional law 
40. Compare Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 
616, 631 (1949) (Opinion of Keen, J.). 
41. 115 s. Ct. 1447 (1995). 
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to the judiciary. RFRA dictates statutory law to the judiciary, 
which is what Congress does. 
The proper question is federalism. Which legislature has au-
thority in this area? Does Congress' section five enforcement 
power permit it to legislate restrictions on state government that 
go beyond what section one of its own force gives the judiciary 
power to impose on its own? My intuition is that Scalia, despite 
reservations about the Court's prior reasoning in cases like Mor-
gan and Oregon v. Mitchell, would not vote to overrule those 
cases-not because Scalia is unwilling to tear down doctrine he 
thinks wrong, but because RFRA, at least, can be seen as consis-
tent with a fair construction of the proper scope of the section 
five power. If anything, RFRA is far easier to sustain under the 
Morgan power-in either its "remedial" or "substantive" vari-
ants-than were the statutes at issue in Morgan and Oregon v. 
Mitchell themselves. It is far less of a stretch to find that Con-
gress may enforce the Free Exercise Clause by enacting legisla-
tion banning laws that impose substantial burdens on free 
exercise that are not justified by compelling governmental pur-
poses than to find (for example) that a ban on English literacy 
tests is a "remedy" for denial of equal protection rights to gov-
ernment services.42 Scalia, to the extent resistant to Morgan, 
might even find Flores an occasion for damage control. 
All of the arguments why RFRA is constitutional under any 
reading of the Morgan line, broad or narrow, are fully set forth in 
the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion in Flores. To strike 
down RFRA, Scalia has to launch a jihad against Morgan. He 
doesn't have the votes (three, maybe four max) and there's no 
point in attempting to overthrow the existing regime if you're 
going to fall short-ali that gets you is a six vote reaffirmation of 
Morgan and a result that invalidates RFRA because one or two 
zanies think it violates the Establishment Clause for government 
ever to accommodate religion. That is not a result Scalia wants. 
Besides, it is not even clear to me that Scalia is a committed 
opponent of Morgan, or that he should be. A strong formalist, 
textualist, originalist case can be made that Morgan is correct on 
the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment's indeterminate con-
stitutional language permits Congress to legislate, pursuant to 
section five, any rule not demonstrably inconsistent with the nec-
essary meaning of section one (including an "incorporated" Free 
Exercise Clause). The same indeterminate language should 
mean that, in the absence of congressional action, the courts may 
42. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53. 
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not strike down state legislative enactments unless they are de-
monstrably inconsistent with the necessary meaning of the text: 
thus the result in Smith. In short, there is a principled approach 
to Morgan-I might even venture to say the correct approach-
that would permit Scalia to say (in effect): "Smith was right, Mor-
gan was right, RFRA is all right, and I am always right." 
That may be overstating things a bit, but it does turn on its 
head Scalia's critics' armchair psychoanalytical nonsense that 
Scalia will vote against RFRA because it is a slap in the face to 
his opinion in Smith. To the contrary, the habits of mind and 
characteristics of temperament that make Scalia so, well, Scalia-
like are more likely to produce a bold, brilliant opinion explain-
ing how Smith and RFRA can both be right. At any rate, tearing 
down Morgan does not appear to be one of Scalia's pet projects. 
The theory that Scalia is so committed to the anti-exemptions 
view of Smith that he will try to take down Morgan seems to rest 
on an overreacting of Smith as hostile to religious liberty. In fact, 
however, Smith is hostile only to judicially-created balancing 
tests that rest on tendentious readings of ambiguous textual pro-
visions, and that deploy such tests to upset democratic policy 
choices. Morgan and RFRA can (on this reading) be upheld in a 
way that vindicates and reaffirms this central principle of Scalia's 
jurisprudence. At least that's how I'm betting. 
As goes Scalia, so goes Thomas. Or at least so goes the say-
ing. With regard to RFRA, though, I think it's more accurate to 
say that if Scalia is a yes vote for RFRA, Thomas is a fortiori a 
yes vote for RFRA. The above line of reasoning, even if it 
doesn't persuade Scalia, should. For Scalia to reject RFRA 
would confirm the view that he is intensely committed to the no-
exemptions view of Smith, and that this prevails over his general 
jurisprudential philosophy. Thomas, however, shares the same 
general jurisprudential philosophy as Scalia but is probably only 
weakly committed to Smith, if that. He became the sixth vote for 
Smith in Hialeah, but that does not necessarily signal strong 
agreement so much as acquiescence in a majority precedent, re-
jection of which was not necessary to reach the result in Hialeah. 
It is entirely possible that Thomas joined the majority opinion in 
Hialeah because it really was not a Smith-type statute, meaning 
that the Smith question really was not presented. And, as noted. 
even agreement with Smith does not necessarily imply rejection 
of RFRA. 
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Thomas's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Swanner v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission43 in 1994, seems a moder-
ately strong signal of support for RFRA. Swanner presented a 
RFRA challenge to application of a marital status discrimination 
lawsuit against a landlord acting pursuant to sincere religious 
convictions. The decision below was adverse to the religious 
landlord, and Thomas suggested that review was appropriate in 
part because of the confusion of lower courts over the interpreta-
tion of RFRA and in part because Thomas was "quite skeptical" 
that Alaska's asserted interest would satisfy the "stringent stan-
dards" of RFRA.44 Thomas, too, thinks an anti-accommodation 
reading of the religion clauses is nonsense. All of which leads me 
to think that Thomas will vote to uphold RFRA. 
That brings the pro-RFRA count to seven. Will the Chief 
make it eight? On the face of it, Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
is the least likely vote for RFRA, if the criterion is prior opinions 
on similar legal issues. Rehnquist has consistently-early and 
often-opposed the pro-exemptions reading of the Free Exercise 
Clause. His lone dissent in Thomas v. Review Board, in 1981, 
charted the intellectual territory that led to the gradual accept-
ance of essentially the same view by a majority of the Court in 
199(}.45 There is nothing in Smith (except for unpersuasive distin-
guishing of prior precedents) that Rehnquist hadn't already said, 
better, in dissent in Thomas. Rehnquist has also been a consis-
tent Morgan-resister. He dissented in City of Rome.46 He is a 
largely consistent pro-government, pro-state power conservative, 
who has never met a Free Exercise Clause claim he really likes or 
an exercise of the section five power that he thought didn't in-
trude on state or local governmental prerogatives. He is a consis-
tent pro-state power federalist, as illustrated by his majority 
opinions in National League of Cities and United States v. 
Lopez.47 
But Rehnquist has never been hobgoblined by a foolish con-
sistency. He also, in recent years, has displayed a growing fond-
ness for the swift, simple, cut-to-the-chase, don't-write-too-much, 
paper -over-the-differences, we-can-always-fix-it -later opinion. 
(Perhaps he misses Justice White a bit: Now there was a Justice 
who could crank out opinions in a quick, no-nonsense fashion! 
43. 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
44. Id. at 461. 
45. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
46. 446 U.S. 156, 206 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
47. National League of Ciities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); United States v. Lopez, 
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
24 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:7 
And if the opinion didn't make entire sense out of an issue, or 
wrestle with the hard questions presented by the Court's resolu-
tion, tough.) I can easily see Rehnquist writing the opinion-
brief, curt, near-unanimous, brushing aside the objections to 
RFRA with dispatch that says less than O'Connor and Souter 
would like about protection of the constitutional right of free 
religious exercise, less about how important and sensitive the 
Court is than Kennedy might prefer, less about the proper theory 
of Morgan than Scalia and Thomas might like, and, in general, 
that doesn't say much of anything terribly interesting at all (or 
that says some very interesting things in a rather casual manner). 
I envision an opinion that resembles in tone, length, and style 
(and in unanimity or near-unanimity) Rehnquist's opinions for 
the Court in Hustler v. Falwe/l48 and Wisconsin v. Mitche/149: sim-
ple, straightforward, clear (so far as it goes), unambitious, not 
attempting a comprehensive review and clean-up of the law. It 
might simply apply "our precedents" without embracing them 
(and perhaps with a nudge toward reading them narrowly), leav-
ing everyone happy (or unhappy) to fight their little doctrinal 
battles another day. But the opinion would at least resolve the 
question of RFRA's constitutionality so that we can move on 
with life. (Besides, we can always "fix" RFRA by reading the 
compelling interest test in a pro-government manner whenever 
we really want to, as the pre-Smith experience proved.so) 
That's eight votes, even putting Justice Stevens to one side 
(where he belongs) as either hopeless or hopelessly unpredict-
able. I can be wrong on one of the eight (and experience shows 
that I'll probably have missed the mark on at least one) and still 
make my 7-2 line. That gives me two justices to spare before I 
lose my wager with Professor Lupu, which was after all not on 
the exact head count but on whether RFRA would be upheld in 
the first Supreme Court case squarely addressing and resolving 
the issue. RFRA will be upheld. 
The timing of this issue of Constitutional Commentary 
should be such that this prediction will be published before the 
Court's opinion in Flores is handed down (which, of course, 
won't be until the last two or three weeks of the Term, along with 
Bill Clinton v. Paula Jones and the other "biggies" of the Term). 
My editors have chained me to the mast of my pre-page proof 
predictions. So my prediction is just hanging out there for all to 
48. 485 u.s. 46 (1988). 
49. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
50. See generally Paulsen, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 249 (cited in note 2). 
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see. If wrong, I will suffer the ignominy of my own publicly-dis-
played incompetence. If so, please, Chip, just try not to gloat too 
much. 
